Outdoor recreation in Northwest Minnesota is popular year round, and many residents and visitors participate in activities such as hunting, fishing, snowmobiling, boating, and much more. Land available for hunting, however, is at a particular premium. Hunters overall do not appear to have enough land on which to hunt as they compete with both other hunters and state regulations. Some private land owners have land that they keep for their own hunting purposes, and some of that land is kept exclusively for hunting. Private landowners in NWMN have consistently demonstrated an unwillingness to open their land to outside consumptive recreational uses, such as hunting, even for a fee. This situation may leads to potential overuse of some land with respect to hunting, while other land is potentially underused, creating a potential "tragedy of the anticommons". Meanwhile, hotels and resorts in the region are engaged in the ever-growing worldwide trend of ecotourism and agritourism, though they have relatively few arrangements with private land owners. In this study, a probabilistic demand approach is used to analyze strategic interaction between land owners and hunters based on the results of three surveys conducted for the State of Minnesota and the Economic Development Administration (EDA). Mechanisms to create an outcome that aligns the utility maximization strategies of land owners and hunters are suggested.
Introduction
Looking over the vast fields of Minnesota, one could be forgiven for forgetting that land is a scarce resource. Northwest Minnesota (NWMN) is abundant in land and is one of the world's leading growers of sugar beets, among many other crops. Outdoor recreation is popular year round, and many residents and visitors participate in activities such as hunting, fishing, snowmobiling, boating, and much more. Hunting is particularly popular. For example, in 2016, the total deer harvest was 173,213 (down from around a decade earlier, which reached around 225,000) 1 .
Hunting land, however, is at a particular premium. The Minnesota Department of Natural Resources has indicated that finding suitable land on which to hunt can be difficult. Minnesota is, compared to many other states, rich in public land. Around seventy-five percent of land in Minnesota, however, is privatelyowned, and most hunting takes place on private land 2 . The Minnesota Department of Natural Resources also acknowledges the tension between private land owners and hunters. They indicated that private land becomes closed to hunting when the lack of understanding of the landowners' situation and viewpoints.
Land owners have many reasons for which they do not want their land opened to outside use 3 . Land for sale is often indicated as "hunting land," and those who purchase it, despite the significant role they play in wildlife management, may not want outside parties to hunt on their land, despite the benefit that could have to wildlife and natural resource management [1] 4 .
Wildlife is inherently both a scarce resource and a common resource. As a common resource, it is regulated by the state through legislation and hunting licenses. More land equates to more potential wildlife, within one's statutory annual limit, and less competition from other hunters. Hunters do not appear to have enough land on which to hunt as they compete with both other hunters and state regulations. Some private land owners have land that they keep for their own hunting purposes, and some of that land is kept exclusively for hunting. This leads to some land potentially being overused with respect to hunting, while other land is potentially underused, creating a potential "tragedy of the anticommons" [2] . Despite the potential for additional revenue and a more efficient allocation of resources, anecdotal evidence has suggested that private landowners in NWMN have consistently demonstrated an unwillingness to open their land to outside consumptive recreational uses, such as hunting, even for a fee.
Meanwhile, hotels and resorts in the region are engaged in the ever-growing worldwide trend of ecotourism and agritourism. Survey evidence suggests, however, that they have very few arrangements with private land owners. There is a great divide in the number of commercial arrangements between hospitality operations and private land owners and the number of such arrangements that the hospitality operations would like to have. That suggests a definite market potential, but the interest in doing so appears to be rather one-sided. Were land owners to be induced to participate, however, such hospitality operations could potentially serve as an effective manager of the private land's use by outside parties, thereby address some of the concerns private land owners have expressed.
This study uses the results of three surveys conducted for the State of Minnesota and the Economic Development Administration (EDA). The first asked private land owners in NWMN about their current land use and their willingness to accept compensation for opening land to outside parties for recreational purposes, including hunting. The second survey asked hospitality operations in NWMN about their current agritourism and ecotourism operations and their interest in expanding such recreational opportunities for their guests. This third survey was administered to hospitality operations in the region and asked questions pertaining current levels of ecotourism and agritourism offerings to their guests and their interest in expanding, including through collaborations with local land owners. The results of the surveys together show a shortage of land made available for hunting to outside parties has resulted due in part to private ownership and the preferences of private owners. A potential opportunity exists to meet the demand of hunters for land by using hotels and resorts in the region that are engaged in agritourism and ecotourism. Such an outcome may be able to align the utility maximization strategies of land owners and hunters, thereby increasing economic efficiency.
Background
Private owners can potentially increase efficiency through opening land, either pro bono or for a fee, to outside hunters [3] . However, decision strategies of land owners may be biased against opening land to outside use. As owners of property, they have the right to exclude [4] . Their decision strategies may be influenced by factors beyond price, such as psychological factors and the interaction with information and other land owners [5] . When two parties to a potential contract, i.e., the supply side and the demand side, differ sufficiently in terms of decision strategy, it is possible that a sub-optimal allocation of resources will result due to a misalignment of incentives. Redistribution of use of a particular parcel of land, for example, may yield gains for some while also imposing costs asymmetrically [6] . Such a misalignment can also contribute to social costs [7] . However, if the costs imposed in the situation of denying land use to outside hunters are justified by the benefits otherwise realize by the private ownership of the land, then the incentive to improve the situation for hunters is reduced, for it comes into direct conflict with the real or perceived benefits to land owners [8] .
One such cost that could be imposed on private land owners opening their land to outside parties is a loss of intangible value of the land as perceived by its owner. This is similar to the way in which agricultural land bought en masse by outside investors may damage society through damage to the family farm, which 
Survey Data
The primary survey instrument was designed to collect data from private land owners on their willingness to accept compensation (WTA) for opening their private land to outside parties for various recreational purposes. This study focuses on the specific consumptive use of hunting due to the high prevalence of hunting in the region and due to the fact that hunting requires tracts of land both of sufficient size and wildlife content, and there can easily be a scenario in which demand for land exceeds willing supply. willing to open land is asked to specify the various uses that would be allowed.
Quantitative questions regarding acreage currently opened or that would be willing to be opened were included. Valuation questions were included to attempt to determine the land owner's WTA for opening land. An additional survey was administered to NWMN residents and non-residents from elsewhere in the US and Canada to determine willingness to pay for various recreational activities, including hunting. [10] .
A Land Use Model of Parallel Rationality
Additionally, in terms of strategic interaction between the land owners and outside parties, the "power distribution" is inherently unequal. The land owners, being the owners, have all the power over the use of their land, within the law, and have the sole right to decide whether to open that land to outside parties [11] . In the presence of such an asymmetrical power distribution, the payoff matrix for each side may be such that compromise between land owners and outside parties over land use is not a stable equilibrium (Carrillo and Palfrey, 2009 The surveys support anecdotal evidence attained before the said surveys were given and suggests that land owners and hunters have different decision strategies such that the optimal outcome for one is statistically different from the optimal outcome of the other. Drawing from probabilistic demand, a Choice Wave, then, may be used to model both groups as two separate consumer types. Choice Waves are mathematically orthogonal in an n-dimensional Hilbert space and represent non-interacting decision strategies yielding statistically different outcomes in expectation value [12] [13] . Each Choice Wave represents its own noninteracting, parallel economic "world," each with its own decision strategy and its own rationality distinct from those in other "worlds." In that framework of economic parallel rationality, the classical economic man still exists, yet there is an infinite number of different versions in an infinite number of parallel economic worlds in hyperspace.
In the land use scenario of the present study, there are two worlds: land owners and hunters. There is "Economic Man-Land Owner" and "Economic ManHunter." However, since in this case that division does not represent two different groups of consumers, but rather two sides to a potential transaction, the Choice Waves do not represent different segmentations of a market, but two distinct stakeholders in the land use decision. That is, the stakeholders in the land use decision exist within two parallel rational economic worlds. If the decision strategy of each parallel state of rationality results in a utility maximizing land use allocation significantly different from the utility maximizing choice other stakeholders, then there is a misalignment of incentives, and an inefficient allocation of land and sub-optimal outcomes may quite likely result. That is, if land owners and hunters have significantly different utility maximizing levels of use of private land for hunting by outside parties, then the incentives of land owners and hunters are misaligned, and a sub-optimal allocation of private land for outside use may result. However, even in such a case of sub-optimal allocation of land for hunting, the distribution of burden is borne asymmetrically due to the asymmetrical power distribution, i.e., the private land owners have all the power relative to the hunters regarding how they use their land. Land owners can easily choose their utility maximizing level of land allocation for hunting by outside parties, and the optimal level of land desired by the hunters need not be achieved in order for the land owners to maximize utility. That utility maximizing choice by the land owners may impose an externality in the form of overuse of other available land by hunters; crowding of hunters, creating potentially dangerous situations; and wildlife management issues.
Under the assumption that there exists a goal of inducing more private land owners to open their land to outside parties for hunting, then it is necessary to establish a "bridge" that can span the two economic worlds and align their incentives, creating a more efficient allocation of resources and a more optimal allocation of land use. Certain mechanisms and/or institutions may be able to serve as a bridge between two different groups, better align incentives, and promote a more efficient allocation of resources [14] .
In the absence of strong institutions or mechanism that facilitate land use transactions between private land owners and outside parties, there is likely to be a lack of commitment by both sides [15] . The public may see little incentive to use a particular parcel of land, other things being equal, instead continuing to use land that may be overused or overcrowded. Hunters seek land on which to hunt, and the ownership of specific piece of equivalent land is irrelevant unless said ownership imposes costs on the hunter. Land owners similarly feel little commitment to the public in terms of providing land for hunting, which may simply indicate preferences. It also may be a form of response to the lack of commitment by the public, i.e., the hunters simply want suitable land for hunting, so land owners may assume that if they do not open their land to outside hunters, the hunters will simply find other land.
Again, the land owners are the stronger party in the transaction, and so they are more likely to prefer slowing the release of land usage and negotiation due to a real or perceived mismatch in incentive compatibility [15] . Other things being equal, the land owners and the public, i.e., the hunters in this case, can be modeled as being in states of parallel rationality. They each seek to maximize utility rationally according to their decision strategy. So, utility maximization by one party is reasonably expected to yield a land use level different from that determined by utility maximization by the other party. If that is the case, then they cannot achieve a total market efficient outcome without a bridge.
Bridges can be artificial or natural. Artificial bridges comprise certain types of mechanisms that help to align incentives and improve outcomes, such as an institution established for such a purpose. However, recalling that, in this frame- 
Choice Wave Models
Equation (1) gives a Choice Wave model of the probabilistic decision strategy of land owners, where k is a probability function of some form, l is the principal decision variable, i.e., amount of land willing to open to outside hunters, x is a bundle of all other decisions that might impact choice regarding opening land, Y is the standard income constraint, and B is an artificial bridge, such as an institution designed to bring land owners and hunters together. Interaction between land owners and hunters, as well as interaction between each side and outside parties, may result in influence that impacts decision strategy and hence expectation value of outcome. That is included in Equation (1) as net F n from a multipoint gravitational model [5] . The term F net is the net influence of others on the land owner, and n is the strength of the land owner's own influence over others. 
In Equation (1), the Choice Wave for land owners is expressed as variable over time except at the decision point, at which time the Choice Wave collapses to a probability of 1 for the selected level of l. The expectation value, then, is expressed as some function of the Choice Wave and is given in Equation (2) .
The functional form of z must be such that the expectation value in Equation (2) equals that of the observational revealed preferences. Also, since the Choice Wave in Equation (1) contained the possibility of an artificial bridge, B, the expectation value in Equation (2) necessarily changes based on the value of B.
The amount of land demanded by hunters may be expressed by a Choice
Wave as in Equation (3), which is identical in functional form to that of the land owners, with the addition of the subscript D to indicate different functional forms of the probability and constraint functions for the demand side. 
In the absence of the bridge, the expectation values for the supply and demand sides are given in Equations (4) and (5) 
Given the orthogonality of the Choice Waves, the expectation values in Equations (4) and (5) clearly cannot be equal. Given that the supply side, i.e., the land owners, are more likely to want to open less land than the hunters want, it is reasonable to assume that
If an artificial bridge were to exist, then 1 B > . Assuming it to be a "perfect" bridge that aligns choices absolutely,
, and so 
. That is, the probabilistic outcomes momentarily align. In those cases, the optimal allocation of resources occurs because the utility-maximizing choices of each side align. However, it is only for that specific interaction, as the exact allocation of resources is never known until the decision point. Given its likely rarity, since the expectation values of each side of the transaction are statistically different, the presence of natural bridges is unlikely to eliminate the inefficiencies in the market overall. Indeed, natural bridges could only completely eliminate market inefficiency if they occurred at each and every decision point. Given the different in expectation values, such an occurrence would be expected to have an extremely low probability.
The probability of a natural bridge ought not to be ignored, however. If they occur, they at least create a momentary increase in welfare. If they occur frequently, then the Choice Waves of the two sides, though orthogonal, must be such that they generate expectation values that are statistically different, but not very much so. Also, if a natural bridge occurs, it shows what potential there might be for market improvement and might aid in the development of institutions or mechanisms that could serve as artificial bridges. The probability of a natural bridge occurring is given in Equation (6).
In Equation (6), a i and a j represent all ranges over which there is probabilistic overlap, i.e., the areas where natural alignment of choices may occur. For example there may be low-probability ranges of land use out in the tails of the probability function of both the land owners and the hunters that overlap, even though their expectation values are quite different. The closer the expectation values of the two groups are, the higher P Bridge is, implying more areas of overlap.
With too much overlap, on the other hand, orthogonality disappears, and t he the Choice Wave permits each choice that may maximize utility and no choice that will not maximize utility. Each utility-maximizing choice has a probability contained within the Choice Wave, and therefore each such choice is possible at the decision point, however likely or unlikely each may be. It is quite theoretically possible that both land owners and hunters may have land use choices that are unlikely for each group, but still could not only occur, but occur simultaneously. That is a natural bridge.
Since an artificial bridge is part of the constraint (see Equation (1) 
Summary of Land Use Survey Results
Forty-eight landowners in the NWMN region responded to the land use survey.
With a 95% confidence level, and assuming a total number of land owners of hunting land in all of Minnesota of approximately 4500
5
, and a response distribution of 50%, the margin of error is 14.07%. However, it was expected a priori that results would be skewed in the direction of not being willing to open land to outside use. If a response distribution of 88.24% is assumed, which is the actual distribution in the results, then the margin of error is 9.07%. Neither a margin of error of 9.07% nor one of 14.07% is enough to change the interpretation of the results.
Few of the land-owner survey respondents were interested in opening land to outside hunters (or other recreational uses) for a variety of reasons (vide infra). Table 1 provides a summary of respondent answers regarding use of their land for recreational purposes.
As Table 1 indicates, a number of the respondents make quite regular use of their land for themselves across a wide variety of outdoor activities and sports common in the region. There is much less interest in letting outside parties use the land. There is even less interest in opening land to outside parties for profit or pay as opposed to not for profit or pay. Our family uses this land a lot and we feel allowing others on it would conflict with our use.
We already share this resource with others. Safety and legal liability issues and concerns. Do not want people on my land for camping, fishing, snowmobiling, etc. at all.
Land is more valuable for other uses. Do not want people on my land for hunting/fishing, etc. that I do not know. 
Discussion
The survey results have more contained within them than may be obvious in The results, then, suggest that a pair of Choice Waves of the form indicated in Equation (1) would be logical. Following that, therefore, the values for Equations (4) and (5) are necessary to span the economic worlds of land owners and hunters, which could potentially be in the form of an institution aimed at aligning incentives. In addition, given that many hospitality operations in the region are looking to make arrangements with private land owners for agri-ecotourism, the hospitality industry may be a useful intermediary between the land owner and the guests.
Conclusions
This The following is the original transcript of the three surveys from which the data were gathered. The transcript was then programmed into the Qualtrics system with appropriate modifications for the system and administered via the internet.
Northwest Minnesota Land Use Survey
Administered to Land Owners in the Northwest Minnesota area.
Category 1: Demographics
The order of presentation of each sub-category should be randomly varied among survey respondents.
LOCATION:ZIP Code, State, County AGE: 18-22, 23-27, 28-32, 33-37, 38-42, 43-47, 48-52, 53-57, 58-62, 63-67, 68-72, 73-77 The order of presentation of the following land use choices within each subcategory AND the order of presentation of the subcategories should be randomly varied among survey respondents.
There should be three mutually-exclusive selection buttons next to each choice as follows: The order of presentation of the following questions should be randomly varied among survey respondents. e. I am not interested in partnerships with hotels.
f. I have tried partnerships with hotels in the past, and they were unsuccessful.
[ Note that this section is omitted if the respondent in Category 3 indicated "No" to all questions, i.e., is not interested in opening land to outside use in any circumstance whatsoever.
The Questions display in the order provided. : 18-22, 23-27, 28-32, 33-37, 38-42, 43-47, 48-52, 53-57, 58-62, 63-67, 68-72, 73-77 
Residents
This category is only for those whose ZIP codes place them outside NW Minnesota.
The following questions are presented in the order given. This category is only for those whose ZIP codes place them outside NW Minnesota.
The following questions are presented in the order given. The open-ended (free response) bids received in the pre-survey will be used to establish one or more starting-point bids for the final survey.
